GitHub Security Lab Open-Sourced an LLM That Babysits AFL++ So You Do Not Have To
Point it at owner/repo, get harnesses, coverage loops, and review-required vulnerability reports. Disposable VM required. Blind merges forbidden.
Point it at owner/repo, get harnesses, coverage loops, and review-required vulnerability reports. Disposable VM required. Blind merges forbidden.
EOL controllers on public IPs, melted inventory, political statements about weaponised food. The fix was network exposure hygiene, not another webinar.
Vague invite, baby-domain CAPTCHA, zip, legitimate remote-support installer. Your tray icon is their shell.
Authenticated root RCE on the management interface, KEV the day of disclosure, three IPs in the advisory. Here is a lab grep session so you can hunt before the jump box excuse wears thin.
Unauthenticated root via a crafted attachment on File Reputation. Patched builds from September, exploitation notice and KEV in mid-October. Check contentscannerstatus.
Fortinet published hashes, IPs, and an archive account named archive234. Here is a lab grep-and-hash session so you can find tenants who moved in before the patch.
Personalized collab email, fake verification platform, Google sign-in step. Your channel, Gmail, and recovery codes are the payday.
Allegations, sealed complaint, conference arrest. The industry that sells ‘we talk to criminals so you do not have to’ just got a governance wake-up call.
No malware file. Just a browser form, a forced retry, and WatchGuard’s own signed client from the CDN. Endpoint tools see nothing. Your VPN gateway sees everything.
Third max-severity WorkPlace SSRF since July. Patch day October 6, scanners by October 8. The September hotfix builds are now the affected ones.